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Was Justice Done? The Rosenberg-Sobell Case. By Malcolm P. Sharp. New
York: Monthly Review Press, 1956. Pp. xxxvi, 216. $3.50.
Professor Malcolm P. Sharp has performed a great public service by his book
Was Justice Done? which examines the Rosenberg-Sobell case from the point
of view of the evidence presented and its credibility or the reverse. The case is
one of those arousing such strong passions on the one side or on the other that
few people have the intellectual self-control required'for a calm appraisal. Professor Sharp has this self-control. He is not and has never been a Communist.
He is a man trained in the estimation of evidence and in the legal relevance of
facts. He was concerned in the last stages of the Rosenberg case, but only because, as a lawyer, he came to the conclusion that justice was not being done.
Like most people, he had been inclined to accept the verdict of the Court, and
it was reluctantly that he was compelled to change this opinion. I have not
found in his book any evidence of bias on his part. So far as I am able to judge,
he gives due weight to all the evidence that was offered; and when he rejects or
questions any piece of evidence, he does so either on grounds of internal inconsistency or because the witness concerned had powerful motives for departing
from the truth. His book is as admirable in form as it is in substance, and in both
respects deserves the highest praise.
It may be thought an impertinence for one who is not an American to find
fault with a decision of the American Courts. As to this, I should wish to say
that every country, and indeed every social group, is liable, from time to time,
to an attack of mass hysteria. England had such an attack at the time of the
Popish Plot and was on the verge of it in the early months of 1918. France had
two very fierce attacks of mass hysteria, the first in 1793, and the second at the
time of the Dreyfus case, but, at the end of the second, recovered sanity and
brought Dreyfus back from Devil's Island. The Rosenbergs cannot be brought
back.
Such attacks are apt to occur whenever a community is exposed to intense
fear, and are apt to take completely irrational forms, as, for example, when the
Japanese punished Koreans for the Tokyo earthquake. Mass hysteria is one of
the most disastrous of human propensities and, unfortunately, it is not confined
to this or that nation. In regretting and combatting any one of its manifestations, it is important to remember that no one nation is specially prone to this
form of irrational behaviour.
In reading Professor Sharp's record, if one is not caught in the web of terror
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that enmeshed police and judge and jury and witnesses, all alike, the inability
of the participants to form calm judgments is quite undeniable. It seems to be
an accepted maxim that a known perjuror is always to be believed if he says
what the police wish him to say; but if he says anything else, one may remember
his addiction to perjury. It seems to be also an accepted maxim that, if a man
known to have committed a crime makes a statement, after having been told
by the police that if he makes it he will escape punishment or have a light sentence, what he says, under the influence of such pressure, is bound to be gospel
truth. When, on the other hand, the Rosenbergs, down to the very day of their
execution, were told that their lives would be spared if they would incriminate
others, and when they totally refused to do so, this is not regarded as evidence
of courageous innocence, but as a shocking example of Communist cunning.
The conviction of the Rosenbergs depended mainly upon the evidence of the
Greenglasses. Greenglass was Mrs. Rosenberg's brother and modelled his conduct upon that of Cain. As one critic quoted by Professor Sharp justly states:
"The story of David Greenglass is so obviously false in *so many material respects that he is entitled to no credence; a dog should not be put to death upon
the strength of his testimony" (p. 94).1 If his testimony is accepted, he was as
liable to the death penalty as the Rosenbergs were; but in view of his denunciation of them, he received only a fifteen-year sentence and Mrs. Greenglass was
not indicted. Professor Sharp deals at length, and very convincingly, with the
console table which derived its importance from the fact that it throws doubt
upon the Greenglasses' veracity and from the circumstance that new facts about
it were discovered shortly before the Rosenbergs' execution and were made the
basis of an application for a new trial. This application was hastily rejected on
frivolous grounds after the judge had refused to see the console table which the
defence asserted to be the one in question.
Judge Kaufman injected prejudice into the proceedings by attributing to
the Rosenbergs all the misfortunes of the Korean War. He seems to have
thought, as most non-scientific Americans apparently did, that there was something which could be called the "secret" of the bomb, which was thought of as
analogous to a magic formula in medieval necromancy. He led the jury to believe that the Rosenbergs had given this "secret" to the Russians and had
thereby emboldened them to cause the North Korean invasion of South Korea.
This whole conception is quite wide of the mark. There was very much less
that was secret about the atom bomb after Hiroshima than was popularly
supposed.
There are curious inconsistencies, which do not seem to have struck those
who were concerned in the trial. For example, witnesses stated with great emphasis that a Communist spy in telephoning would seldom give his real name,
but would substitute a code name that had been assigned to him. Nevertheless,
1
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great play is made with the assertion that somebody who telephoned gave his
name as "Julius," and therefore must have been Rosenberg.
The evidence against Sobell, who got a thirty-year sentence, was even more
flimsy than the evidence against the Rosenbergs. judge Kaufman directed the
jury that, if they did not believe the testimony of Elitcher, they must acquit
Sobell. Elitcher had stated on oath that he had never been a Communist, which
the police knew to be false. He therefore knew himself to be liable to prosecution
for perjury. He denounced Sobell, who had been his best friend, and he has
never been prosecuted.
It is commonly alleged by those who consider that the guilt of the Rosenbergs
and Sobell was established that the case was reviewed by the Supreme Court.
This is not so. The Supreme Court was asked to review the case, but refused.
Apart from the question whether the verdicts were right, there is something
utterly horrifying about the indecent haste shown by all the authorities in the
last stages of the case. The application for a new trial on the basis of new evidence was rejected before there had been time to examine the new evidence.
Legal proceedings did not terminate until two o'clock on June 19, 1953. An
appeal to the President for clemency cannot be made until the legal proceedings
are concluded. Counsel for the Rosenbergs endeavoured to place an appeal for
clemency before the President. They met with every kind of obstacle from red
tape and do not know to this day what final consideration was given to the case
by the President. The execution had been fixed for eleven p.m. on that same
day, but when it was pointed out that this would be on the Jewish Sabbath, the
time of execution was advanced to be just before sunset on that same day. Up
to the last moment, the Rosenbergs knew that they could escape the death penalty by breaking the Ninth Commandment. They refused, and died. Those who
had not refused, survived.
Sobell, unlike the Rosenbergs, though he refused to bear false witness, is still
alive and can still be helped. He is in Alcatraz prison, which is supposed to be
for recalcitrant criminals, though the only way in which he has shown himself
recalcitrant is in his refusal to denounce others as his accomplices in the crimes
which he has not committed. It may still be hoped that there are enough people
in the United States who hold that a man should not be punished for a crime
unless there is convincing evidence that he has committed it, to secure by
means of agitation that Sobell is granted a new trial. I cannot believe that in
the somewhat calmer atmosphere of the present time he would again be
convicted.
Professor Urey contributes to the book an introduction which is valuable not
only because of the scientific accuracy of his judgment but also because, as a
distinguished nuclear physicist, he is in a better position than most others to
judge as to what was possible in the way of espionage. He deserves very high
praise as one of the first non-Communists to question the justice of the verdicts.
The miscarriage of justice, as I firmly believe it to have been, in the Rosen-
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berg-Sobell case is analogous to such cases as the Sacco-Vanzetti case and, as I
remarked before, the Dreyfus case. One is driven to ask: is there anything that
can be done to prevent innocent people from unjustly suffering in times of national excitement? At such times, judge and jury, alike, are incapable of calm
judgment. The crimes alleged are so heinous that some of the horror of the
crime spills over on the accused before he has been proved guilty. Witnesses
who take the unpopular side incur odium and are liable to be dismissed from
their employment; whereas those who take the popular side are acclaimed as
heroes. The case of Matusow is interesting in this connection. By his own
account, he hired himself out to commit perjury for money. But after a time he
repented and said that he had been guilty of perjury. As soon as repentance led
him to give up perjury, he was prosecuted for perjury. People who have been
Communists and have ceased to be so have a lucrative and popular career before
them if they are willing to invent stories that the police like to hear; but, if
not, they suffer all the disabilities to which ordinary ex-Communists are
exposed.
I am not a lawyer and I do not know on what principles lawyers decide as
to the credibility of witnesses; but from the point of view of common sense, it
seems to me that if a man who is known to have committed perjury will derive
great advantages if he says A and suffer severe penalties if he says B, one cannot
feel quite sure that he is speaking the truth when he says A. And, speaking still
from a layman's point of view, I should have thought that, if you are not quite
sure, you ought not to inflict the death penalty. It is commonly said by those
who derive comfort from soothing platitudes that it is better that ninety-nine
guilty men should escape than that one innocent man should be punished. More
or less inadvertently, we have allowed our institutions to develop so as to favour
the exact opposite of this result. To prove guilt, we have a vast public machine
of policemen and detectives and public prosecutors, all supported by public
money; whereas the proof of innocence is left to private people at their own
expense and without any of the facilities that belong to the police. People have
not realized adequately that what happens in court has required long preparation and great skill in deciding how to present the material. All this preparatory
work is arranged on the assumption that the public has an interest in proving
guilt but not in proving innocence.
It is customary among Western nations to speak with horror of the Police
State, quoting the two awful examples of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia.
The examples are truly awful. When the Russians were engaged in acquiring
power over the countries that became satellites, it was always the control of the
police that they sought first. We do not wish the police forces in our countries
to have the kind of power that they have in Communist countries, but I think
we are not always sufficiently careful to avoid steps in that direction. It is not
the business of the police to insure justice. That is, or should be, the business
of the courts. It is the business of the police to secure convictions, and, unless
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their virtue is almost superhuman, they will not invariably be careful to insure
that it is only against the guilty that they seek convictions. A state of affairs
easily arises where those who belong to some unpopular party or who for some
reason are opposed to the government come to feel terror in the thought that
the police may at any moment accuse them of some crime and, even if they are
lucky enough to be acquitted, they probably suffer financial ruin owing to the
suspicion which has fallen upon them. Where this happens, there is no true freedom; and it is pretty sure to happen wherever police power is unchecked. The
police in Western nations have not shown themselves very adept at catching
genuine political offenders. When there were bomb outrages at the end of the
First World War, none of the perpetrators were caught, but two innocent men
were put to death and another innocent man, after being sentenced to death,
had his punishment commuted to penal servitude for life. This caused the ignorant public to believe in the efficiency of the police. Professor Sharp's book
deals with a more recent example of the same pattern. I hope it may awaken
the public to the realization that to be accused is not necessarily to be guilty.
BERTRAND RUSSELL (Tni EARL RUSSELL)*
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Charles Beard and the Constitution. By Robert E. Brown. Princeton: Princeton
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Not very long ago, Charles A. Beard's An Economic Interpretationof the Constitution, conceived as an antidote to piety, was itself made sacrosanct by historians. Like all books that rouse and disturb, it met at first with professional hostility; however, unlike most of its kind, it gained professional approval, not from
direct confirmation, but from its congruence with prevailing social theories and
numerous complementary studies. Beard's main idea-that the Constitution
was an economic document put over by economic groups-came into fashion
with the larger assumption that the law is a way of defining the property relations of society, and that men seek to rationalize their interests and pursue their
interests rationally. Beard's second thesis-that the Constitution was designed
to check democracy and was ratified against the wishes of the majority-was
in line with studies of that period that showed society rent by class antagonisms
(Carl L. Becker), democracy unleashed by revolution (J. F. Jameson), conservatism once again resurgent in the fight for control of the states (Allan Nevins).
Beard's own scholarship, however, escaped close scrutiny: it was too massive
and seemingly too meticulous to invite a thorough reauditing. When Beard
issued a new edition of his work in 1935, twenty-two years after the first printing, he could say that nothing in the interval had happened to make him alter
or reinterpret his facts.
Alas! historiography will not admit such a thing as a permanently immune

